Skip to content

SECURITY.md

Latest commit

 

History

History
66 lines (52 loc) · 3.61 KB

SECURITY.md

File metadata and controls

66 lines (52 loc) · 3.61 KB

Security Policy

Heimdall is a verification layer for coding agents, so we hold our own security to the same standard we hold your code to: nothing ships unproven — including our own history.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security issues privately, not in a public issue or pull request.

  • Open a GitHub Security Advisory on this repository (Security → Advisories → Report a vulnerability). This keeps the report confidential until a fix is ready and gives us a private channel to coordinate.

What to expect:

  • Acknowledgement target: within 48 hours. We confirm receipt and let you know whether we can reproduce it.
  • We work a fix and a coordinated disclosure timeline with you. We credit reporters who want credit; we honor requests to stay anonymous.
  • No bug bounty. Heimdall is an MIT-licensed open-source project with no paid disclosure program. We are grateful for responsible reports regardless.

Please give us a reasonable window to ship a fix before any public disclosure.

Supported scope

In scope Out of scope
The Heimdall harness, gates, sentinels, and hooks in this repo. Vulnerabilities in Claude Code or the Anthropic platform — report those to their respective projects.
The latest released version on the default branch. Issues that require a user to run --dangerously-skip-permissions in a throwaway sandbox (that flag is documented as autonomy with no safety classifier in the loop).
Bypasses of a quality or safety gate that let unproven code through. Third-party dependencies — we will help upstream the report.

Only the latest released version receives security fixes. There are no separately maintained release branches.

Secret hygiene

Heimdall treats leaked credentials as a build defect, not an afterthought — and it points that policy at itself first.

  • A standing secret-scan gate guards every push. Heimdall's security sentinel runs gitleaks over the working tree and the commit range a push would publish, before any code leaves the machine. A finding is a hard fail: the push is blocked until the credential is removed and rotated. This is the same git push gate that re-triggers the falsifiability and corpus checks — security is part of the proof, not a side-channel.
  • It can run earlier too. The same scan is safe to wire as a local pre-commit step so a credential is caught before it is ever recorded, not just before it is pushed. The gate is designed to run at whichever boundary you put it on.
  • It degrades honestly, never falsely. If no scanner is installed, the gate reports skipped and names the missing tool — it never reports "clean" without a real scanner having actually run and found nothing. A pass means a real tool ran; a skip means go install one. (Install gitleaks to get a real verdict; trufflehog is a supported fallback.)
  • The principle: a verification system that cannot prove its own history is clean cannot be trusted to prove yours. So the same secret scan that protects contributors protects this repository's own commits — credentials are kept out of history by construction, not by hope.

If you find a credential that did make it into the tree, please report it through the private channel above rather than opening a public issue, so it can be rotated before attention is drawn to it.