| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.1.x | Yes |
Do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting:
https://github.com/Providex-AI/rootsign/security/advisories/new
Or email: info@getprovidex.com
You will receive acknowledgement within 48 hours. We target a patch release within 14 days for critical issues.
In scope: vulnerabilities in the RootSign SDK, IngestHandler, or CLI that could allow:
- Tampering with audit records without breaking the hash chain
- Bypassing hash chain verification (
verify_chain) - Leaking redacted PII through the SDK
- Forging Approval / Decision records or escalation chains
- Unauthorized writes to the canonical data model
Out of scope:
- Issues in third-party dependencies — report upstream first; if RootSign needs to pin or work around, open a security advisory here as a tracking issue once the upstream report exists
- Theoretical attacks with no practical exploit path
- Denial-of-service against single-tenant local deployments (the Phase 1 storage layer assumes a trusted operator)
- Social engineering of maintainers
RootSign's framework integrations ([langgraph], [crewai]) pull in
larger third-party trees that may carry their own CVEs. Our policy:
- CVEs in dependencies whose vulnerable code path is NOT reachable
from any RootSign code path are dismissed on the GitHub Dependabot
board with the reason "Vulnerable code not in execution path" and a
pointer to this section. Example: the
chromadbHTTP-server pre-auth code injection CVE arrives throughcrewai's extra, but RootSign never importschromadb, never starts its HTTP server, and never usestrust_remote_code=true— the attack surface lives in the user's own infrastructure if they choose to run a ChromaDB server, not in RootSign. - CVEs in dependencies that ARE in our execution path get a pin bump in the next patch release. If no upstream fix exists, we pin to a non-vulnerable predecessor or remove the dependency.
- Test-only dependencies (anything in the
[test]/[dev]extras, not in runtime deps) follow the same rule but with reduced urgency because end-users don't install them.
If you believe we've misclassified a transitive CVE (i.e. the vulnerable code path IS reachable from RootSign), file it via the private vulnerability reporting flow above. Don't open a public issue.
Once a fix is released, we will publish a CVE-style advisory describing the issue, affected versions, and the fix. We credit reporters by name (and link, if provided) unless you ask us not to.