You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
{{ message }}
The RegistrationMagic – Custom Registration Forms, User...
Moderate severity
Unreviewed
Published
Jun 27, 2026
to the GitHub Advisory Database
•
Updated Jun 27, 2026
The RegistrationMagic – Custom Registration Forms, User Registration, Payment, and User Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity in all versions up to and including 6.0.8.6. This is due to the PayPal IPN callback handler being registered as a nopriv AJAX action with no authentication or nonce requirement, and critically because the handler updates the payment log database row with attacker-controlled POST data — including payment_status and the custom field encoding the target user_id — before PayPal IPN validation is performed, meaning the database remains poisoned even when validation subsequently fails. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to authenticate as any WordPress user, including administrators, by submitting a forged IPN request that overwrites a payment log entry's user_id with that of a target account, then visiting the success return URL with a legitimately obtained security hash to cause the plugin to issue real WordPress authentication cookies for the targeted account.
The RegistrationMagic – Custom Registration Forms, User Registration, Payment, and User Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity in all versions up to and including 6.0.8.6. This is due to the PayPal IPN
callbackhandler being registered as a nopriv AJAX action with no authentication or nonce requirement, and critically because the handler updates the payment log database row with attacker-controlled POST data — includingpayment_statusand thecustomfield encoding the targetuser_id— before PayPal IPN validation is performed, meaning the database remains poisoned even when validation subsequently fails. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to authenticate as any WordPress user, including administrators, by submitting a forged IPN request that overwrites a payment log entry'suser_idwith that of a target account, then visiting the success return URL with a legitimately obtained security hash to cause the plugin to issue real WordPress authentication cookies for the targeted account.References